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Defendants Edith 
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Cathedral of the 
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Catholic Church 
of East South 
Temple 
Civil No. 7770 
MOTION TO DISMISS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Comes now The Employers' Liability Assurance Corpora-
tion, Ltd., and moves that the Court make and enter an order 
dismissing the purported appeal by cross-defendant~ Edith M. 
Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the Magdalene Catholic Church 
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of East South Temple, Salt Lake Citj, Utah, also known as 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, a corporation sole, 
on the grounds and for the reasons as follows: 
1. That said cross-defendants have failed to comply with 
the provisions of Rule 72 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
2. That cross-defendants purport to appeal from an order 
· which is ·not a final judgment against them, and that said 
appeal fails to comply with the provisions of Rules 72 (a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN AND RICHARDS 
By GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
Attorneys for Defer;dant and Respondent} The Employers·' 
Liability Assurance Corporation1 Ltd. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since none of the various briefs have set out the facts 
material to the issues raised by the brief of the cross-defendants 
and respondents, Edith M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the 
lvfagdalene of the Catholic Church of East South Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, also ·known. as Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Salt Lake City, a corporation sole, these facts will be briefly 
set out in this reply brief to the said brief of the cross-defend-
ants. 
The cross-complaint by the respondents and def~ndant 
The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., states 
that the Catholic Church and the cross-defendant Hazelrigg 
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are residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and that the 
plaintiffs have filed the present action against the defendant 
Corporation, as appears from the files and records. The cross-
complaint alleges that plaintiffs have alleged fraud in the 
ad..rninistration of the Charles Carson estate. 
In Paragraph 4 of the cross-complaint it is alleged that the 
estate of Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson consisted solely of 
assets distributed to the estate from the estate of Charles · 
Carson, and that all the benefits from the Grace Catherine 
Sweeney ~arson estate caine from the estate of her deceased 
husband. The paragraph further states, ttthat all of the cross-
defendants \vere devisees of Grace Catherine Sweeney· Carson 
and received as such devisees and legatees certain benefits, 
moneys and properties from said estate; that each and all of 
them were well and truly advised and had full and complete 
knowledge of the· fact that all of such sums, properties and 
devisees so received by them were in effect coming· to them 
from the estate of Charles Carson and were each and all 
of them fully advised of all of the proceedings, relationships, 
family, heirs and matters concerned and pertaining to the 
estate of Charles Carson. 
((That particularly all of said cross-defendants were aware 
of the mat~ers contained in and the various proceedings con-
ducted and testimony introduced in the various proceedings 
· and matters pursuant to the estate of Charles Carson." 
It is .then alleged that all of the devisees knew of the 
appointment of the surety company as surety in the Charles 
Carson estate. It is then alleged in general terms that in the 
event the defendant Bonding Company should have judgment 
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entered against it, it should have judgment against the persons 
who received the estate to the extent that these persons bene-
fitted from the wrongful distribution. It is alleged that the 
bondsman is entitled to look to the property of the estate and 
((to each of the defendants to save the said The Employers' 
Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., harmless as to any such 
judgment" (R. 62-65). 
The prayer of the cross-complaint is that in the event 
the plaintiffs have judgment against The Employers' Liability 
Assurance Corporation, Ltd., the said defendant and cross-
plaintiff have judgment against each of the cross-defendants 
for the amounts, ·sums and benefits received by each of said 
cross-defendants nin connection with or arising out of the 
estate of either Charles Carson and/ or the estate of Grace 
Catherine Sweeney Carson; and further, that the Court make 
and enter its order requiri~g said cross-defendants and each 
of them to hold this cross-plaintiff harmless from any and all 
liability arising out of or in connection with the administration 
of the estate of the said Charles Carson." There is also a prayer 
for general relief. 
The effect of this pleadi~g is to bring before the Court 
the beneficiaries of the Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson 
estate, which persons are the same beneficiaries as the Charles 
Carson estate, and to ask the Court to impose a trust upon the 
property which the plaintiffs claim was wrongfully distributed. 
In other words, the surety company say~ in substance that it 
denies that there was any fraud committed in the estate of 
Charles. Carson, and that is its position in the present appeal 
of the order dismissing the complaint. H.owever, if there was 
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fraud, and if, as plaintiffs allege, that fraud was committed 
by Mrs. Carson and/ or the administrator which she appointed, 
then the property distributed to the executor of Mrs. Carson's 
estate and through that estate to the various devisees was 
in fact received by all "rith notice of all infirmities, and the 
real heirs are entitled to recover the property. In th~ event 
of recovery against it, the surety company is entitled to be 
subrogated to the position of the heirs and their right to follow 
such assets. 
This defendant m its alternative pleading against the· 
cross-defendants alleges that they had notice of the same facts 
which were before the Court in the Charles Carson estate, 
and that if there was any fraud in the procurement of the · 
decree of distribution these cross-defendants had knowledge 
of the fraud. In any event, they were not takers for value 
because, as appears from the probate file of Mrs. Carson, 
they \Yere only devisees and legatees of her estate. All the 
assets of her ·estate consisted of the assets of the Charles 
Carson estate. That being so, the Company alleges in sub-
stance and effect that it is entitled to recover over against the 
cross-defendants to the extent of the value of the property 
which they received. 
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and motion 
to strike of the cross-defendants and the case went to trial upon 
their answers. At the conclusoin of plaintiffs' evidence, the 
defendant surety company made its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint and the present action on the vartous grounds 
stated, including that the plaintiffs had not proved extrinsic 
fraud (R. 744 et seq.) 
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The cross-defendants there upon made a motion to dismiss 
the cross-complaint (R. 749 et seq.) The Court ruled that 
the motion to distniss the cross-complaint was not timely be-
cause a determination had not been made at that time as to 
whether the plaintiffs had proved any theory which justified 
any relief against the defendants, and the motions were pre-
mature (R. 750-752). Employers did no~ rest on its cross-
complaint against cross-defendants (R. 759). 
The brief of Edith M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the 
Magdalene Catholic Church of East Temple was filed without 
a petition for an intermediate appeal, despite the fact that 
there has been no judgment against them on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
CROSS-COMPLAINT. WAS PREMATURE AND THE 
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS TO THIS COURT 
ARE PREMATURE .. 
. POINT NO. II 
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSEOF 
ACTION AGAINST THE CROSS-DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CROSS-COMPLAINT WAS PREMATURE ANI) THE 
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS TO THIS COURT 
ARE PREMATURE. 
Rule 72 (a) of the lJtah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from 
all final judgments in accordance with the rules provided. 
The only procedure for an appeal from an interlocutory order 
is provided in Rules 72 (b). 
In the case at bar the cross-defendants made their mo-
tion that the cross-complaint against. them be dismissed before 
the cross-plaintiff had even put on any· evidence, much less 
before it had rested. The cross-defendants now allege as error 
that the cross-complaint was not dismissed, despite the fact 
that no justiciable issue has been . yet raised by the evidence 
against. the cross-defendants in support of the cross-complaint 
of The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. The 
cross-plaintiff has not rested its case or, indeed, even submitted 
evidence in support ·of its cross-complaint. 
It is, of c·ourse, true that if this Court affirms the decision 
of the district court, defendant, The Employers' Liability As-
surance Corporation, Ltd., will have no claim except the pos-
sibility of claiming costs for the writing of this brief on appeal 
against these particular cross-defendants .. The only allegation 
that is made against Hazelrigg and the Magdalene Church 
by The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., is 
that if there was fraud, and if plaintiffs are able to show that 
the property which went into the Grace Catherine Carson 
estate was fraudulently obtained, then the surety company 
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being subr~gated to plaintiffs' rights, is entitled to follow that 
·property. If this Court holds that the property was not fraud-
ulently obtained, there is, of course, no claim against these 
cross-defendants. Undoubtedly cross-defendants properly joined 
in defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, but until it 
was determined that the Employers Company was liable, the 
alternative pleaded by the corporation did not even raise an 
issue against the cross-defendants. 
It is submitted that the motion to dismiss the cross-com-
plaint was premature. 
Moreover, the cross-defendants have no decision of which 
they can complain at the present time in this C<?urt. They 
have not had a final judgment entered against them; they, 
therefore, cannot appeal from a final judgment pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 72 (a). They have not filed a petition 
for interlocutory appeal, and apparently do not even purport 
to claim any right to appeal under the provisions of Rule 
72(b). 
It is submittecl that the questions raised by the cross-de-
fendants' briefs are premature and should not be passed upon 
by the Court at ·this stage of the proceeding. 
POINT NO. II 
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSEOF 
ACTION AGAINST THE CROSS-DEFENDANTS. 
Cross-defendants, Hazelrigg and Church of the Magda-
lene Catholic Church, argue that the cross-plaintiffs attempt 
10 
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to attack collaterally the Decree of Distribution in the e.state 
of Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson. The cross-defendants 
do not refer to the allegation~ of the cross-complaint on the 
subject. It seems clear that if there had been a careful reading 
of the cross-complaint and of the theory which it presents to 
the Court, cross-defendants would not have made their argu-
ments on this point. 
The plaintiffs' theory in this case, as stated in the brief 
submitted to the Court, is that the administrator of the Charles 
Carson estate· and the widow are guilty of extrinsic fraud in 
the particulars enumerated, and that the extrinsic fraud re-
sulted in the estate being distributed to the legal successors 
in interest of Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson.. Plaintiffs 
allege that in fact the estate should have been distributed in 
whole or in part to them. If plaintiffs successfully establish 
this proposition, they will have been able to ·require the bonds-
man of the administrator to. pay to them a money judgment 
for the value of the property thus wrongfully distributed. 
The bonding company will, of· course, be subrogated to 
plaintiffs' rights. If? assuming that . the plaintiffs establish 
extrinsic fraud, plaintiffs could. have followed the assets 
wrongfully distributed to the 'distributee of the Charles Carson 
estate and to any other persons except bona fide takers for 
value, and there is no reason in principle why the bonding 
company cannot pursue the same remedy in this action. That 
is precisely what the bonding company pleads in the cross-
complaint. 
Cross-defendants assert that there must be a showing of 
extrinsic fraud in the Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson estate. 
11 
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This, · however, is a complete misconception of the theory of 
the cross-complaint. The bonding company alleges in sub-
stance that in the event the plaintiffs prove extrinsic fraud, 
then the distributee of the Charles Carson estate, viz: Grace 
Catherine Sweeney Carson, or her legal successor, had dis-
tributed to them· property tainted with fraud. Certainly no one 
could dispute the proposition that if Mrs. Cq.rson had been 
alive ·at the time of the decree in her husband's estate, the 
plaintiffs in this action could have followed the assets and 
obtained a decree declaring themselves to be the owners of 
the property. In this case Mrs. Carson died before the estate 
was distributed to her. The property, instead of being dis-
tributed to her directly, went to her legatees. If f.raud be proved, 
it was still tainted with the same fraud; it still could be re-
covered by the plaintiffs in the same way unless the dis-
tributees were bona :fide takers for value. The necessity for 
establishing extrinsic fraud certainly does not apply to a situ-
ation where all property in an estate is tainted with the fraud. 
If I acquire blackacre ~y fraud or breach of trust, or any 
other device which gives the true owner a right to maintain 
an action against me to recover it, and before the action is 
brought I die, who can assert that the true owner loses his 
right to follow the property and maintain the judgment against 
my legal successors in interest? The entire hornbook principle 
of the right of the equitable owner being cut off only in the 
event of transfer to a bona fide purchaser. stands as a barrier 
to this notion. 
Cross-plaintiffs in the case at bar do not assert that there 
was any fraud in the Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson estate. 
12 
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They assert simply that if there was fraud in the Charles 
Carson estate, all of the property that went into Mrs. Carson's 
estate \Y~ls tained by fraud, and that the cross-defendants who 
received the property took the porperty with knowledge of 
the same facts, and are liable to the rightful owner to the 
extent of the property received. Cross-plaintiffs standing in 
the place of the rightful owners by right of subrogation are 
entitled to assert this right. 
There can be no objection to this position because it is 
an alternative one or because it is hypothetical. Rule 8 (c) ( 2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"A party may set forth two or more statements of a 
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either 
in one count or defense or in separate counts or de-
fenses. When two or more statements are made in the 
alternative and one of them if made independently 
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insuffi-
cient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the ·in-
sufficiency of one or more of the alternative state-
ments. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and 
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on 
both." * * * · 
Rule 8 (f) provides: 
((All pleadings shall be con construed as to do sub-
stantial justice.'' 
Discussions of this provision in the Federal Rule indicate 
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See Barron and Holtzoff Federal Practice & Procedure, Vol. 
1, Sec. 282, Pages 526-532. 
Under the present practice there is prov1s1on for both 
alternative joinder of parties and alternative statement of claims 
for relief. 
It is submitted that the cases cited by the cross-defendants 
in their brief are absolutely inapplicable and inappropriate to 
the issues raised by the cross-plaintiffs' cross-complaint. The 
principles ther contended for to the effect that the extrinsic 
fraud is a prerequisite to the setting aside of a ~ecree are not . 
denied. The proper construction of the pleadings, however, 
does not involve this que~tion of law, but instead involves 
the· application of the principles of constructive trusts and 
following the rest. 
The Court's attention is invited to Scott on Trusts, Vol. 
3, Sections 507-552,. Pages 2431-2602, on that subject. It is 
not believed that. citation of authority for the principles con-
. tended for is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the points raised by the 
Magdalene Catholic Church and Hazelrigg in their brief 
are premature. The assertions. made are in the nature of a 
cross-appeal, despite the fact that no determination on the 
merits has been made against them and there has been no 
petition for intermediate appeal. Moreover, the position of 
these· parties entirely ignores the issues tendered by the cross-
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
complaint. This Court should not pass upon the issues pre-
maturely raised. The decision of the trial court on the merits 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, MclviiLLAN & RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent, The Employers' 
Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. 
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